In this paper, we investigate the aggregate behavior of populations of learning agents. We compare the outcomes in homogenous populations learning in accordance with imitate the best dynamics and with replicator dynamics to outcomes in populations that mix these two learning rules. New outcomes can emerge. In certain games, a linear combination of the two rules almost always attains an equilibrium that homogenous learners almost never locate. Moreover, even when almost all weight is placed on one learning rule, the outcome can differ from homogenous use of that rule. Thus, allowing even an arbitrarily small chance of using an alternative learning style can shift a population to select a different equilibrium.
Introduction
Learning in games, at the population level, can be modeled by dynamic adjustment processes (Swinkels 1993; Fudenberg and Levine 1998) . For example, the "proportional imitation" learning rule leads to the replicator dynamics (Schlag 1998), originally proposed by theoretical biologists to describe the growth of a haploid population (Taylor and Jonker 1978) . Similarly, the best response dynamics (Gilboa and Matsui 1991) can R. Golman (B) Department of Applied and Interdisciplinary Mathematics, University of Michigan, 2082 East Hall, 530 Church Street, Ann Arbor, MI 48109, USA e-mail: rgolman@umich.edu arise as the continuous time limit of a belief-based learning rule like fictitious play or in a population of myopic best responders. The models that lead to the replicator dynamics and those that lead to the best response dynamics make mutually incompatible assumptions about how strategies are updated, offering no middle ground.
In this paper we propose combining an imitative variant of best response dynamics (Hofbauer 1995) with the replicator dynamics to form tractable composite dynamics. We find that a population is sensitive to the presence of more than one learning style in that composite learning dynamics may have basins of attraction that share little overlap with the homogeneous learning dynamics from which they're formed. We focus in particular on a linear combination of imitate-the-best and replicator dynamics, which we show to select an equilibrium not attained by homogenous use of either pure learning rule in certain matrix games. Introducing even arbitrarily small weight on an alternative learning rule may cause the resulting linear combination of rules to locate a different equilibrium than the pre-existing pure rule. A feature of the class of games we consider is the existence of a temporary initial best response-an action that looks good at first, but that cannot survive against itself. The temptation to try such an action instead of an equilibrium action creates complex dynamics, which allow the effects of subtle differences in learning styles to build up over time.
In imitate the best dynamics (as with best response dynamics), players slowly adopt myopic best responses, ignoring the possibility that the population mixed strategy may soon change. For a matrix game, the resulting flows are piecewise linear in the direction of the best response to the current population state. In replicator dynamics, players copy others' strategies, so more successful actions spread in the population. 1 These population dynamics can be derived from revision protocols that describe how individual agents learn. We combine imitate the best and replicator dynamics by combining the underlying revision protocols, forming a rule in which either learning protocol may be tried with some positive probability.
For a specific class of coordination games, we show that introducing even a small presence of a second revision protocol into a population changes which equilibrium the population locates. This result underscores the importance of accurately determining exactly how agents learn. Our result builds off of existing comparisons of basins of attraction and equilibrium selection under the best response dynamics and replicator dynamics (Golman and Page 2010a,b) . The contribution of this paper is to explore the behavior of a composition of dynamics. We find that heterogeneity across learning styles may bring about new outcomes not foreseeable from analysis of the homogenous dynamics induced by the component learning styles.
Our treatment of equilibrium selection relies on analysis of the deterministic dynamical system. The learning rules define paths through the strategy space that attain equilibria in the games we consider. The equilibrium that is selected is thus a function of the initial population mixed strategy point and the learning dynamic. Nevertheless, we obtain results that hold throughout the interior of the strategy space by focusing on cases in which the basin of attraction of a particular equilibrium approaches the entire space. Our approach does not assume random shocks that allow the popula-
